商业研究

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集团财务公司对成员企业投资价值的影响

王雪梅   

  1. 重庆工商大学 财政金融学院,重庆 400023
  • 收稿日期:2016-12-28 出版日期:2017-04-18
  • 作者简介:王雪梅(1981-),女,河北保定人,重庆工商大学财政金融学院讲师,管理学博士,研究方向:公司财务政策与公司治理。
  • 基金资助:
    重庆工商大学博士科研启动经费项目“混合所有制控股模式对企业财务风险和资本成本的影响”,项目编号:1455004;重庆市教育委员会人文社会科学项目“资本成本约束下的商业类国有企业混合所有制改革研究”,项目编号:16SKGH095。

The Influence of Group Financial Company on the Investment Value of Member Enterprises

WANG Xue-mei   

  1. School of Finance, Chongqing Technology and Business University, Chongqing 400023, China
  • Received:2016-12-28 Online:2017-04-18

摘要: 集团财务公司是企业集团内部融资的资本市场,其实际运行的作用是降低了成员企业的融资成本、提高了资金使用效率,还是加剧了集团与成员企业的代理冲突、增加了代理成本,这对于外部投资者对集团成员企业的投资决策具有重要的参考价值。对此,本文以2010-2013年A股上市公司的数据计算行业平均代理成本、资产负债率、Z得分、净资产利润率,并与拥有集团财务公司的成员企业的相关数据进行差异显著性分析。研究发现:集团财务公司收紧了成员企业现金流,加大了对成员企业的监控,触动了成员企业管理层利益,提升了成员企业的代理成本,影响了成员企业的经营业绩;从整体利益考虑,集团财务公司掏空了成员企业,致使成员企业的财务风险高于同行业的平均水平,成员企业管理人员的在职消费水平大于或等于同行业的平均水平,但投资者收益却与同行业的平均水平没有显著差异。因此,对拥有集团财务公司的成员企业的投资风险更大。

关键词: 财务风险, 代理成本, 投资者收益

Abstract: The group financial company is the capital market of group internal financing. The actual operation effects, such as reducing enterprise′s financing cost and improving the use efficiency of funds, or exacerbating the agency conflict between members enterprise and group and increasing agent cost, have important reference value for outside investors′ investment decision to the members enterprise of group.Therefore, based on the data of A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2013, the average agency cost, asset-liability ratio, Z-score and net assets profit rate are calculated, and the significant differences are analyzed between them and the relevant data of the members with group financial company. The study found that: the group financial companies tightened the member enterprises′ cash flow and strengthened supervision to member enterprise, which violated management′s interests of member companies, increased the agency cost of some member enterprises and affected the performance of member enterprises; based on group′s whole interests, the group emptied the member enterprises through financial company, which resulted in the member companies′ financial risk was higher than industrial average and the managers′ on-the-job consumption level was higher than the industrial average, however, there was no significant difference between the average level of investors returns and the industrial average. As a result, the investment risk to member enterprises controlled by a group with financial company is higher.

Key words: financial risk, agency cost, investor returns