| 注释：.
①这里的报酬是指物流园区管理委员会委托园区入驻物流企业代理相应的物流业务而分配给物流企业的货币化收入，包含利润分成和固定收入等。.
②一般情况下，物流园区管理委员会委托给园区入驻物流企业代理的物流业务量越多，物流企业承担责任风险程度也就越大，利润分成比例也就越高，ε也就越大。.
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