创业板上市公司CEO权力与企业研发投入

商业研究

创业板上市公司CEO权力与企业研发投入

王楠1,2，苏杰1，陈守双3

1.北京工商大学商学院，北京 100048；2.北京工商大学国有资产管理协同创新中心，北京 100048；3.中国工程院战略咨询中心，北京 100088

收稿日期:2016-11-30 出版日期:2017-07-20
作者简介:王楠（1983-），女（朝鲜族），辽宁营口人，北京工商大学商学院/国有资产管理协同创新中心副教授，研究方向：创新管理与战略投资；苏杰（1992-），男，福建漳州人，北京工商大学商学院研究生，研究方向：投资决策；陈守双（1982-），女，山东聊城人，中国工程院战略咨询中心工程师，研究方向：创新管理与战略管理。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金青年项目，项目编号：71602006；教育部人文社科青年基金项目，项目编号：16YJC630121；科技创新平台-商科特色项目（2017）资助；国家自然科学基金面上项目，项目编号：71672003；北京市属高校长城学者培养计划项目，项目编号：CIT&TCD20170308。

The Influence of CEO Power on R＆D Investment in GEM

WANG Nan1,2,SU Jie1,CHEN Shou-shuang3

1.School of Business, Beijing Technology and Business University，Beijing 100048,China; 2.Collaborative Innovation Centre for State-owned Assets Administration，Beijing Technology and Business University，Beijing 100048,China; 3 Strategic Consulting Center, Chinese Academy of Engineering, Beijing 100088,China

Received:2016-11-30 Online:2017-07-20

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 充足的资源对于确保连续的研发活动、减少研发运营的不确定性、提高创新能力是必要的，而CEO的权力大小对于公司战略和资源分配具有重要影响。本文从组织权力、所有权权力、声誉权力和专家权力维度构建CEO权力测度方法，并以我国创业板2010-2013年上市公司为样本对CEO权力与企业研发投入关系进行实证研究，发现创业板上市公司CEO权力与企业研发投入存在显著正相关，且政府补助和研发人员规模均对CEO权力和企业研发投入之间的关系存在正向调节作用。因此，赋予公司CEO更大的权力，充分发挥其“管家”精神，有助于促进企业研发投入；同时，争取更多的政府补贴、保证企业研发人员充足的规模，有利于减少资源约束、提高抗风险能力、增强CEO信心，有利于加强CEO权力对于企业研发投入的正向促进作用。

关键词: CEO权力, 研发投入, 政府补助, 研发人员规模

Abstract: Adequate resources are necessary, which can ensure the continuity of R&D, reduce uncertainty of R&D and improve the ability of innovation, while the power size of CEO has an important impact on corporate strategy and resource allocation. This article first builds CEO power measure method from organization power, ownership rights, reputation rights and expert power four dimensions, and then makes an empirical study of the relationship between CEO power and R&D investment by taking GEM listed companies in China from 2010 to 2013 as samples. Results show that there is significantly positive correlation between CEO power and R&D investment, and the scales of R&D staff and government subsidies have a positive adjustment role in the relationship between CEO power and corporate R&D investment. Therefore, CEO should be given more power to play fully its “housekeeper” spirit in order to promote enterprise R&D investment; at the same time, GEM listed companies should strive for more government subsidies, and keep sufficient scale of enterprise R&D staff, which will help reduce resource constraints, improve risk resistance, enhance CEO confidence, and strengthen the positive role of CEO power in corporate R&D investment.

Key words: CEO power, R&D investment, government subsidies, scale of R&D staff

王楠1,2，苏杰1，陈守双3. 创业板上市公司CEO权力与企业研发投入[J]. 商业研究.

WANG Nan1,2,SU Jie1,CHEN Shou-shuang3. The Influence of CEO Power on R＆D Investment in GEM[J]. 商业研究.

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