商业研究

商业研究

• 经营管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

基于经销商风险规避和公平关切的闭环供应链决策分析

许民利,刘恬,简惠云   

  1. 中南大学 商学院，长沙 410083
  • 收稿日期:2017-05-24 出版日期:2017-09-22
  • 作者简介:许民利（1969-），男，长沙人，中南大学商学院教授，博士生导师，管理学博士，研究方向：供应链管理、行为运筹管理；刘恬（1994-），女，湖南邵阳人，中南大学商学院研究生，研究方向：物流与供应链管理；简惠云（1971-），女，长沙人，中南大学商学院讲师，管理学博士，研究方向：供应链管理、运筹管理。
  • 基金资助:
    湖南省自然科学基金项目，项目编号：2015JJ2177；湖南省智库专项重点委托课题，项目编号：16ZWB40；湖南省社会科学成果评审委员会课题，项目编号：XSP17YBZC201；国家社会科学基金项目，项目编号：14BGL196。

Decision Analysis of Closed - loop Supply Chain based on Retailer′s Risk Aversion and Fairness Preference

XU Min-li, LIU Tian, JIAN Hui-yun   

  1. School of Business, Central South University，Changsha 410083,China
  • Received:2017-05-24 Online:2017-09-22

摘要： 现实中决策者往往不是完全理性的，表现出多种行为偏好。考虑由一个原制造商和一个经销商构成的两级闭环供应链系统，以双方为风险中性和公平中性决策者时的博弈结果为参照，构建原制造商考虑和不考虑经销商风险规避、公平关切行为的差别定价决策模型。研究结果表明经销商风险规避和公平关切行为改变了原制造商和经销商的定价策略，当经销商具备风险规避和公平关切行为时，原制造商应予以考虑，这有利于经销商效用的提升，也可确保原制造商不会得到最坏的博弈结果。经销商风险规避和公平关切行为有损于供应链总利润，影响供应链利润再分配。原制造商考虑经销商风险规避和公平关切行为，只能消除公平关切心理对经销商决策的影响，不能完全消除风险规避心理的影响。

关键词: 风险规避, 公平关切, 差别定价, Stackelberg博弈, 闭环供应链

Abstract: In reality, decision makers are often not fully rational, showing a variety of behavioral preferences. A two-stage closed-loop supply chain with an original manufacturer and a retailer is studied. With the decisions of the original manufacturer and the retailer when they are risk neutral and fairness neutral as references, two different price models under two different situations where the original manufacturer considers retailer′s risk aversion and fairness preference or not are built. The results show that the retailer′s behaviors of risk aversion and fairness preference affect the pricing strategy of original manufacturer and retailer, and the original manufacturer should consider the situation, which is beneficial to the retailer and ensure the original manufacturers don′t get the worst game results when the retailer is risk averse and fairness preferring. Retailer′s risk aversion and fairness preference are always detrimental to the total profit of the supply chain and affect supply chain profit redistribution．That the original manufacturer considers the retailer′s behavior of risk aversion and fairness preference can only eliminate the effects of fairness preference on retailer′s decision, but cannot eliminate the effects of risk aversion.

Key words: risk aversion, fairness preference, differential pricing, Stackelberg game, closed-loop supply chain