商业研究

商业研究

• 商经理论 • 上一篇    下一篇

零售商回收与制造商处理过期食品模式下三方演化博弈

刘大维1,费威2，尹涛2   

  1. （1.北京大学 光华管理学院，北京〓100871；2.东北财经大学 经济学院，辽宁 大连〓116025）
  • 收稿日期:2018-12-16 出版日期:2019-02-15
  • 作者简介:刘大维（1981-），男，辽宁朝阳人，北京大学光华管理学院博士后，研究方向：制度经济学；费威（1982-），女，辽宁鞍山人，东北财经大学经济学院副教授，研究方向：经济优化和食品安全管理；尹涛（1993-），男，江苏宜兴人，东北财经大学经济学院研究生，研究方向：经济优化和食品安全管理。
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金项目，项目编号：71703014；教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目，17YJA630014；辽宁省教育厅服务地方项目，项目编号：LN2017FW015；辽宁省经济社会发展研究课题，项目编号：2019lslktyb-019。

Three-party Evolutionary Game in the Mode of Retailers Recycling and Manufacturers Dealing with Expired Food

LIU Da-wei1, FEI Wei2, YIN Tao2   

  1. (1. Guanghua School of Management, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China; 2. School of Economics, Dongbei University of Finance & Economics, Dalian 116025, China)
  • Received:2018-12-16 Online:2019-02-15

摘要： 针对零售商回收与制造商处理过期食品模式，本文构建零售商、制造商与政府部门的三方演化博弈模型，得到不同参数取值条件下的稳定均衡策略组合，并利用数值仿真直观分析了三方博弈的不同稳定点。主要结论表明：零售商、制造商与政府部门相关过期食品回收处理和监管的“成本”和“收益”比较而导致零售商和政府部门四种不同的演化稳定策略组合，即（不回收，不监管）、（不回收，监管）、（回收，不监管）与（回收，监管），制造商和政府部门三种不同的演化稳定策略组合，即（非正规处理，不监管）、（非正规处理，监管）、与（正规处理，监管）。据此，应增加零售商与制造商正规回收处理过期食品的综合收益等“机会收益”，减少其正规回收处理过期食品的各类“机会成本”，政府部门还需重视过期食品等废弃食品正规回收处理的管控，将其作为考核政府部门食品安全监管工作的主要内容之一。

关键词: 过期食品, 回收处理, 监管, 三方演化博弈

Abstract: This paper constructs a three-party evolutionary game model of retailers, manufacturers and government departments for retailers to recycle and manufacturers to deal with expired foods, and the combination of the stable equilibrium strategies under different parameter values is obtained, and the numerical simulation is used to visually analyze the different stable points of the three-party game. The result shows that the comparison of ′cost′ and ′revenue′ related to expired food recycling and regulation among retailers, manufacturers and government departments lead to four different evolutionary stability strategies combinations for retailers and government departments, i.e. (no recycling, no regulation), (no recycling, regulation), (recycling, no regulation) and (recycling, regulation), and three different evolutionary stability strategies combinations between manufacturers and government departments, i.e. (informal processing, no regulation), (informal processing, regulation) and (formal processing, regulation). According to this, “opportunity gains” such as the comprehensive income of retailers and manufacturers for regular recycling of expired foods should be increased, and various “opportunity costs” for regular recycling of expired foods should be reduced, and government departments also need to pay attention to the control of the formal recycling of discarded foods such as expired foods, and use it as one of the main contents of the food safety supervision work of government departments.

Key words: expired food, recycling and dealing with, regulation, three-party evolution game