卖空机制能否提高上市公司的盈余质量？
——基于转融券制度的准自然实验

商业研究

卖空机制能否提高上市公司的盈余质量？ ——基于转融券制度的准自然实验

刘亭立，姜莹

（北京工业大学经济与管理学院，北京 100124）

收稿日期:2019-06-10 出版日期:2019-11-12
作者简介:刘亭立（1975-），女，陕西韩城人，北京工业大学经济与管理学院教授，博士生导师，管理学博士，研究方向：公司治理、资本市场会计；姜莹（1996-），女，北京人，北京工业大学经济与管理学院研究生，研究方向：公司治理、资本市场会计。
基金资助:
国家社会科学基金面上项目，项目编号：18BGL090。

Can Short Selling Improve the Earnings Quality of Listed Companies? Quasi Natural Experiment based on Refinancing System

LIU Ting-li,JIANG Ying

(School of Economics and Management,Beijing University of Technology, Beijing 100124,China)

Received:2019-06-10 Online:2019-11-12

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 我国证券市场卖空合法化已近十年时间，但前期卖空约束的存在使得该机制对上市公司的治理作用存在争议。基于转融券制度这一准自然实验窗口，本文以2014-2016年我国A股上市公司为研究样本，采用倾向得分匹配法排除了样本选择偏误后，通过盈余反应系数模型检验在卖空约束得到了极大缓解的情况下，卖空的事前威慑效应对盈余质量的影响，并分析不同产权性质及股权结构下影响的效果及差异。研究结果表明，缓解卖空约束具有积极的外部治理效应，潜在的卖空机会具有典型的事前威慑效应，能够有效抑制盈余操纵、提高盈余质量；但对于不同产权性质和股权结构的公司，卖空机制的治理效应对盈余质量的影响不尽相同。上述结论为卖空对上市公司的治理效应提供了不同角度的检验，并为转融券制度的推进及完善提供了调整思路和方向。

关键词: 转融券, 卖空机制, 盈余质量, 倾向得分匹配法

Abstract: The legalization of short selling in China′s securities market has been nearly ten years. However, the existence of early short selling constraints makes the mechanism controversial on the governance of listed companies.Based on the quasi natural experimental window of refinancing system, this paper takes A-share listed companies in China from 2014 to 2016 as the research sample, uses the tendency score matching method to eliminate the sample selection bias, tests the impact of the deterrence effect of short selling on earnings quality through the earnings response coefficient model under the condition that the constraints of short selling are greatly relieved, and analyzes the different property rights and equity effect and difference of influence under structure.The results show that the mitigation of short selling has a positive external governance effect, and the potential short selling opportunity has a typical deterrent effect in advance, which can effectively inhibit earnings manipulation and improve earnings quality; but for companies with different property rights and ownership structure, the governance effect of short selling mechanism has different impacts on earnings quality. The above conclusions provide different perspectives for the test of the governance effect of short selling on listed companies, and provide adjustment ideas and directions for the promotion and improvement of the system of refinancing securities.

Key words: refinancing, short selling mechanism, earnings quality, propensity score matching method

刘亭立，姜莹. 卖空机制能否提高上市公司的盈余质量？ ——基于转融券制度的准自然实验 [J]. 商业研究.

LIU Ting-li,JIANG Ying . Can Short Selling Improve the Earnings Quality of Listed Companies? Quasi Natural Experiment based on Refinancing System [J]. 商业研究.

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