商业研究

商业研究

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控股股东股权质押与企业非效率投资 ——基于金融错配背景的分析

杨松令，田梦元   

  1. （北京工业大学 经济与管理学院，北京 100124）
  • 收稿日期:2019-05-21 出版日期:2019-12-24
  • 作者简介:作者简介：杨松令（1965-），男，河南新野人，北京工业大学经济与管理学院教授，博士生导师，管理学博士，研究方向：公司治理；田梦元（1995-），女，北京人，北京工业大学经济与管理学院研究生，研究方向：公司治理。
  • 基金资助:
    国家社会科学基金项目“新时代背景下跨层次公司社会网络对双元创新的影响研究”，项目编号：18BGL090。

The Effect of Controlling Shareholder′s Equity Pledge on Non-efficiency Investment of Enterprise：Based on the Background of Financial Misallocation

YANG Song-ling, TIAN Meng-yuan   

  1. (School of Economics and Management,Beijing University of Technology,Beijing 100124,China)
  • Received:2019-05-21 Online:2019-12-24

摘要： 控股股东股权质押行为已普遍存在于我国资本市场，这一高风险的融资方式势必会影响企业的投资活动及资本配置效率。本文以2009-2017年沪深两市A股上市公司为研究样本，采用多元线性回归方法，实证检验控股股东股权质押对企业非效率投资问题的影响。研究发现，控股股东股权质押行为会显著增加企业非效率投资。进一步的研究发现，金融错配程度加剧了控股股东股权质押对非效率投资的影响；不同方向下的金融错配亦具有差异化影响——左向错配时控股股东股权质押导致了过度投资问题，右向错配时则导致了投资不足问题。因此，需要从企业的外部监管与内部治理上规范股东股权质押动机和行为，抑制控股股东的侵占行为，发挥股权质押的积极作用；进一步深化金融错配加剧系统性金融风险及其差异化表现的认识，调整、优化金融资源配置结构，提高投资效率。

关键词: 控股股东, 股权质押, 非效率投资, 金融错配

Abstract: Abstract：Controlling shareholders′ equity pledge has been widely used in China′s capital market. This high-risk financing mode will inevitably affect the investment activities and capital allocation efficiency of enterprises.This paper takes A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2009 to 2017 as the research sample, and uses multiple linear regression method to empirically test the impact of controlling shareholders′ equity pledge on the inefficient investment of enterprises.It is found that controlling shareholders′ equity pledge will significantly increase the inefficient investment. Further research finds that the degree of financial misallocation further aggravates the impact of the controlling shareholder′s equity pledge on inefficient investment; financial mismatches in different directions also have a differential impact :when the left misallocation, the controlling shareholder′s equity pledge leads to the problem of over investment, and when the right mismatches, it leads to the problem of insufficient investment.Therefore, it is necessary to standardize the motivation and behavior of shareholders′ equity pledge from the perspective of external supervision and internal governance of enterprises, restrain the encroachment of controlling shareholders, and give full play to the positive role of equity pledge; further deepen the understanding that financial mismatch aggravates systemic financial risk and its differential performance, adjust and optimize the structure of financial resource allocation, and improve investment efficiency.

Key words: controlling shareholder, equity pledge, non-efficiency investment, financial misallocation