商业研究

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基于批发价格契约的低碳供应链协调研究 ——考虑互惠和利他偏好的分析视角

范如国1,林金钗1,朱开伟2,3   

  1. (1.武汉大学 经济与管理学院,武汉 430072;2.中国科学院 科技战略咨询研究院, 北京 100190;3.中国科学院大学,北京 100190)
  • 收稿日期:2020-01-07 出版日期:2020-06-10
  • 作者简介:范如国(1965-),男,湖北潜江人,武汉大学经济与管理学院教授,博士生导师,研究方向:复杂系统管理、演化博弈、供应链管理;林金钗(1987-),女,重庆江北人,武汉大学经济与管理学院博士研究生,研究方向:复杂系统管理、供应链管理;朱开伟(1991-),男,江苏扬州人,中国科学院科技战略咨询研究院博士研究生,研究方向:能源系统。
  • 基金资助:
    国家社会科学重大基金项目,项目编号:14ZDA062;教育部哲学社会科学研究后期资助一般项目,项目编号:19JHQ091。

Research on Coordination of Low Carbon Supply Chain based on Wholesale Price Contract:An Analysis Perspective Considering Reciprocity and Altruism Preference

FAN Ru-guo1, LIN Jin-chai1, ZHU Kai-wei2,3   

  1. (1. College of Economics and Management, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072,China; 2. Institutes of Science and Development, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Bejing 100190, China; 3. University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190, China)
  • Received:2020-01-07 Online:2020-06-10

摘要: 为弥补供应链理性经济人假设或只考虑单一偏好的缺失,基于批发价格契约建立完全自利和社会偏好下(仅零售商具有社会偏好、仅制造商具有社会偏好,以及双方同时具有社会偏好)的供应链博弈模型,分析决策主体的社会偏好对定价策略、碳减排策略、最优订购量、决策主体的利润和供应链的利润及其协调性的影响。研究发现:双方利他偏好程度的增大可激励制造商投资减排;领导者制造商的利他行为有利于减缓供应链“双重边际效用”,而跟随者零售商的利他行为对供应链利润的影响与制造商的社会偏好有关;当双方的互惠偏好起主导作用且认为对方存在不友善行为时,互惠偏好会降低制造商减排积极性并会加剧供应链“双重边际效用”。上述结论延拓了供应链管理理论,为低碳供应链节点企业选择合作伙伴类型以及低碳供应链运作提供了参考。

关键词: 利他偏好, 互惠偏好, 低碳供应链, 碳减排, 供应链协调

Abstract: In order to make up for the lack of rational economic man hypothesis or single preference in supply chain, the paper establishes a supply chain game model with complete self-interest and social preference (only retailers have social preference, only manufacturer has social preference, and both sides have social preference) based on wholesale price contract, and analyzes the influence of social preference of decision-makers on pricing strategy, carbon emission reduction strategy, optimal order quantity, profit of decision-making body and profit and coordination of supply chain.The results show that: the increase of altruistic preference of both sides can stimulate manufacturers to invest in emission reduction; the altruistic behavior of leader manufacturer is beneficial to slow down the “double marginal utility” of supply chain, while the influence of altruistic behavior of follower retailer on supply chain profit is related to manufacturer′s social preference;when the reciprocal preference plays a leading role and considers that the other party has unfriendly behavior, the reciprocal preference will reduce the manufacturer′s enthusiasm for emission reduction and aggravate the “double marginal utility” of the supply chain. These conclusions extend the theory of supply chain management, and provide a reference for low-carbon supply chain node enterprises to choose the type of partners and low-carbon supply chain operation.

Key words: altruistic preference, reciprocal preference, low-carbon supply chain, carbon emission reduction, supply chain coordination